JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. (November 1990), Wright reports that more respondents said they voted for the Senate winner than actually could have. The probability of erroneous reports increases as the gap between the election date and the interview date widens. This effect interacts with the margin of victory (i.e., the larger the margin, the larger the overreport). The consequence, Wright maintains, is biased coefficients in voting models-the influence of presidential vote on Senate vote is underestimated while candidate-based effects are overestimated (Wright 1990).
using exit poll data are the standard against which all other polls should be evaluated. Wright lets exit polls off too lightly; he does not turn his critical eye on exit poll data. Many differences between academic surveys and exit polls besides interview date could cause differences in regression coefficients. If measurement error has been adequately modelled, the source of error can be included as an additional regressor. When this is done with the NES/SES data the resulting coefficient estimates do not look at all as Wright suggests they should (in fact, they are unchanged). I close by presenting my own model of overreporting, which may help set an agenda for future research in this area.
Wright's Problem: Overreport of Senate Votes'
A sample survey attempts to measure as accurately as possible the attitudes, opinions, and demographic characteristics of the target population. The Senate study measures, among other things, Senate vote. Ideally, the correlation between vote choices reported by survey respondents and actual election outcomes should be 1.0, with error due to sampling variance disregarded. At the state level, the expected value of a survey estimate of the Republican, the Democratic, or the winning vote percentage should be the actual vote percentage. Variation across states in the proportion of respondents who said they voted a certain way ought to bear a 1:1 relationship with actual state-to-state variation. Following Wright (1990) , let RVn = observed percentage vote going to the Republican and AVn = the actual percentage Republican Senate vote in state n. If we regress reported vote on actual vote, both measured at the state level, the slope of the regression line ought to be 45? (hence b, = 1) and there should be no constant over-or underreporting (hence the intercept, bo, should be 0). All this is presented in equation 1.
RVn = bo + blAVn + e (1)
If E(RV,) = AVn, then E(bo) = 0 and E(b,) = 1.0 As Wright shows, the observed relationship deviates substantially from expectations-some degree of overreporting for the winner is going on. The distribution is tilted, with reported vote increasing faster than actual vote (Wright, Figure 1 ). The estimated slope and intercept, obtained through OLS regression, are reported in my Table  1 (compare to Wright, Table 3 ). Is there overreporting? When the actual vote is greater than 80%, the predicted reported vote is greater than 100%. More NES/SES respondents are saying they voted for the winner than actually did. Curiously, the effect is not evident for presidential vote (see Table 1 
Individual respondents report voting for the winner 1.38 times as often as they ought to, if vote reports were unbiased (compare Table 2 , column 1, to Wright, Voters err in their reports of their Senate vote as the gap between the election and the interview date increases; the size of the error increases in proportion to the size of the winning margin (hence the interaction term in equation 3).4 As Wright recognizes, it is one thing to point to a methodological flaw and cry "Error, error!" It is another to show that the error is something to be concerned about. Is this a worrisome situation? Wright thinks it is-he claims that overreporting biases coefficients in other equations. After comparing regression equations that predict partisan Senate choice using NES/SES data to those using ABC and CBS exit polls, he writes, "The conclusion from our estimation of the partisan choice model is that coattail effects are much larger in the exit polls; local factors, incumbency, and candidate spending are substantially larger in the NES/SES data. This pattern shows that the systematic bias in reported vote produces underestimates of the effects of national forces and overestimates of the impact of incumbency/ candidate variables in Senate elections" (1990, 557 Table 2, The second term in equation 4 is exactly right: we expect the probability of overreporting in favor of a Republican to increase as the vote total of a Republican increases. However, b2 is exactly wrong: it indicates that, over time, there is a constant increase (ofb2) in the probability of reporting a Republican vote, independent of who actually won the election. When multivariate analysis is used, the bias should be treated as an omitted variables problem; date of interview should be an additional regressor. If Wright is correct, the coefficients from a vote equation including the new variables ought to look like those obtained from exit poll data."I Instead, the coefficients are virtually identical to Wright's (see Table 4 ). Adding regressors to account for the bias makes no difference in the results, nor does it improve the fit of the model to the data. The relative impact of presidential preference and candidate factors remains the same. The overreporting bias that Wright discovered does not alter our substantive conclusions about Senate voting.
However, the discussion so far sidesteps the larger issue-how to compare exit polls with academic surveys. Wright claims that exit poll data are correct and that NES/SES data are wrong because exit polls are conducted on election day and are presumably free of timeinduced bias. Yet, as my analysis in Table 4 shows, some other difference between the ABC and CBS exit polls and the NES/SES besides winner is not yet known) , or simple forgetting. All this improves the reliability of exit poll data.
There are reasons to suspect exit polls. Some relate to administration. Exit polls attempt to convert initial refusals, but do not attempt anything like the multiple callbacks that a well-run academic poll will employ (low refusal conversion rates can cause serious bias in political measures, particularly those relating to participation; see Brehm, 1989 Brehm, , 1990 ). News deadlines mean there is little time to adjust to problems that might arise during interviewing. Other concerns relate to the sample. Sampling within strata is done either in proportion to the total number of votes cast in some base year or in proportion to current voter registration (Levy 1983 Where the exit poll questionnaire is driven by the need to construct a compelling account on television news and in next morning's byline, the academic poll is driven by questions and issues that concern the scholarly community. At a 1985 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, the rolling cross-section portion of the 1984 NES was criticized by media pollsters because it did not ask the "right" questions about the 1984 campaign. Media polls were criticized by academics because they asked only the "right" questions and little else. Neither situation is ideal.
Future Directions I can think of two possible ways to fit Wright's account with the empirical results. One cause of overreports could be the survey instrument. Over time, the name of the Senate winner receives prominent play in the media while the loser leaves the public stage. Over time, then, information about the winner, particularly the name, is readily accessible, while the loser's name becomes less and less available (and in particular its availability declines relative to the availability of the winner's name). Any information provided within a survey that stimulates recall of the winner's name might result in misreports. The NES provides just this kind of stimulus, and only for House and Senate contests: for these races, the candidates' names are provided. In our attempts to simulate the polling booth, we may be unintentionally biasing vote reports. This explanation accounts for the appearance of overreporting only for the Senate and House. The weaker effect for House voting is a result of the heavier coverage given to the Senate elections. Time comes into play because the relative availability of the winner's name increases as time passes.
A second explanation relies on a model of the process of misreporting.13 Three variables determine the scope of misreporting: confusion, exaggeration, and the election result. Voters may be confused about whom they voted for. Their confusion would vary with their interest in the election and the cognitive effort they put into the vote choice. Voters also exaggerate in favor of the winner due to social pressures (desire to be with the winner, conform to the majority's choice, etc.). Finally, the possibility of misreports is affected by the probability that a respondent could have voted for the loser. This is determined, of course, by the actual election result.
Assume that misreporting m, for the ith individual, is affected only by confusion and exaggeration. The probability of misreports is equal to the joint probability of confusion and exaggeration: Pr(mi) = Pr(Conf) + Pr(Exag) -Pr(Conf) * Pr(Exag) Next, assume that overreporting operates in one direction, toward the winner (you can misreport only if you voted for the loser). Therefore, the probability statement above has to be multiplied by the chance you could misreport at all (i.e., by the loser's vote percentage): Wright's account includes only the first two factors: confusion (forgetting the vote) and exaggeration (as a result of time, media coverage, and associated social pressures). The probability of voting for the loser is left out yet plays a critical role. In the extreme case, voters cannot misreport voting for the winner when a candidate runs unopposed. More practically, the distribution of winning percentages by state assumes a relatively normal shape for the presidency and the Senate, since there are not many blowouts. The House distribution is trimodal-a fair number of close races and a large number of Democratic and Republican blowouts. For blowouts, the likelihood that you could have voted for the loser is low; therefore, the overall likelihood of misreporting is also low.
I combine this observation with conjectural mean values on the other variables in Table 5 . For illustrative purposes, I have used three values in the cell entries, low (.25), medium (.50) and high (.75). These values are arbitrary, but the ranking of the institutions is not. A good argument can be made for each cell value (the logic for cell entries is contained in the note to the Table) .
Though purely speculative, the analysis targets Senate voting as most likely to suffer from overreports. On many dimensions, the Senate falls between the House and the presidency-in citizen interest, campaign intensity, media coverage, and institutional visibility (this is one reason why studying Senate elections holds so much promise for improving our understanding of electoral behavior). Ironically, middling values on the dimensions of interest here-moderately high citizen interest (resulting in less confusion), moderately high media coverage (increasing the potential for exaggeration), and relatively competitive races-results in the highest probability of overreporting bias. Less to its credit, the analysis indicates that the presidential race For the presidential race, I assume that voters were most interested in this race. Therefore I suppose that confusion is low. I assume that exaggeration is high because media coverage is heaviest. Finally, the mean percentage vote won by Dukakis was 45%, with few blowouts-loser vote is scored medium.
Voters are generally less interested in Senate races than in the presidential race but more than in House contests. I score likelihood of confusion medium. Media coverage of the Senate results also falls in between results for the presidency and for the House (Westlye 1987); I score exaggeration medium. Finally, the distribution of Senate loser vote percentage centers on 39%, with few blowouts-I score loser vote medium.
For the House, I score confusion high, since voter interest and involvement in these races has traditionally been low. I score exaggeration low, since there is little coverage of the outcome, certainly nothing rivaling coverage of the presidential or Senate results. Finally, I score loser vote low, since there are many lopsided House elections.
should suffer from overreports more than the House, a result not supported by the empirical findings (though individual-level results on this point are inconclusive). Also, the predicted probability of overreporting the presidential vote is not much smaller than that of overreporting the Senate vote, whereas the observed difference is large. Obviously I could jiggle the numbers to make the results come out cleaner, but that would obscure rather than clarify. Suffice it to say, the next step is to insert real values into this Table. This model of overreporting implicates both systemic and individual-level influences. It suggests where researchers might profitably look for causes of misreporting. Individual-level variables such as education and political interest determine the likelihood of confusion; attentiveness to campaign coverage and group affiliations will effect exaggeration. At the same time, the content of postelection coverage and postelection discussion in a community will determine, in part, the degree of exaggeration. To measure voting for the loser, we could even disaggregate Senate and presidential outcomes to smaller areaswhat was the margin in county A or congressional district B? Most of the measures suggested here are already available: levels of political interest, education, media usage, and group affiliation can be obtained from survey data; election results are publicly available. The missing component is the content of postelection coverage. The model and Table 5 suggest a more complex model of misreporting could be worth pursuing.
Conclusion
The 1988 Senate study is an invaluable resource for congressional and electoral scholars. At present the response rates are unacceptably low; the NES needs to expend considerably more effort in converting initial refusals. The potentially most damaging problem with the study is the bias in vote reports discovered by Gerald Wright. I disagree with Wright both on the cause and effect of overreports. When the question is framed correctly-overreporting votes for the winner-the bias is much less severe than he supposes (failing to meet conventional statistical significance levels). When the date of interview is included in a regression equation predicting vote, the other coefficients are unchanged.
However, there is no doubting that Wright has identified an area for further research. Even if the degree of overreporting in favor of the winner is statistically discernable, a 5% overestimate is cause for concern. Much more work needs to be done on the reasons for the overreport of Senate outcomes. Scholars need to explore the costs and benefits of our current survey strategies, focussing especially on the reason why regression models look so different across exit polls and academic polls. Wright has done the discipline a service in this regard. I have suggested two possible reasons for the overreports that implicate the Senate alone. Both need further study to be proven or disproven. I do not agree with Wright, though, when he recommends large, election-day polls as a solution to the problem. For scholarly concerns, academic polls such as the NES/SES remain the best vehicle. Given current funding constraints, I see no reason to take on the responsibility that is being handled rather well by networks and newspapers. 
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